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Abstract 
Throughout the 1950s and 60s real GDP per working-age person in New Zealand and 
Switzerland grew at rates at or above the 2 percent trend growth rate of the United States.  
Between 1973 and 2000, however, real GDP per working-age person in both countries 
has fallen a cumulative 30 percent below the trend growth path.  Our growth accounting 
attributes almost all of the changes in output growth to changes in the growth of total 
factor productivity (TFP), and not to changes in labor or capital accumulation.  A 
calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model that takes TFP as exogenous can explain 
almost the entire decline in relative output in both New Zealand and Switzerland. To 
understand the recent growth experiences in New Zealand and Switzerland, it is 
necessary to understand why TFP growth rates have fallen so much.   
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  As measured in the Penn World Tables, Switzerland had the highest income per 
capita in the world in 1970, and New Zealand the eighth.  By 2000, Switzerland had 
fallen to eighth, and New Zealand had tumbled to twenty-second in the rankings.
1  These 
changes are less an indication of the rapid growth in other countries than they are the lack 
of growth in New Zealand and Switzerland.  Both New Zealand and Switzerland have 
lost about 30 percent of their output per working-age person, vis-à-vis the United States, 
over the last 30 years.  In this paper, we analyze the growth of these two countries using 
the relatively new neoclassical depression methodology, which is based upon the 
standard neoclassical growth model.  
  Our results suggest that movements in total factor productivity (TFP) can largely 
explain the poor growth performance in New Zealand and Switzerland.  Our growth 
accounting attributes almost the entire decline in output to changes in TFP and a 
relatively insignificant amount to changes in labor and capital inputs.  We calibrate a 
simple dynamic general equilibrium model to the two countries and find that a model in 
which TFP is exogenous can explain about 96 percent of the decline in output for New 
Zealand and more than 100 percent of the decline for Switzerland. 
  In New Zealand, TFP grew on trend until it fell rapidly between 1974 and 1980, 
then leveled out, and now seems to be growing on a lower trend path.  This observation is 
important in terms of the previous work on New Zealand’s productivity.  New Zealand 
underwent one of the most radical and complete set of market reforms in the late 1980s, 
including labor market reform, foreign trade liberalization, privatization of publicly 
owned enterprises, and tax reform.
2  The importance of these reforms has focused much 
of the research on productivity in New Zealand to the period immediately before and 
after the implementation of the reforms.  This line of research has been successful in 
evaluating the reforms and their effects and has provided valuable insight for policy 
makers.  Our results suggest, however, that the economy of the 1970s and early 1980s 
needs to be more closely studied to understand the current situation. 
                                                 
1 This specific comparison is based on the GDP per adult equivalent series in the Penn World Tables.  
Switzerland’s GDP per adult equivalent, expressed in Penn World Table constant 1996 international prices 
was $23,332 – 22 percent larger than the United States, the second richest country in 1970 – and $28,796 in 
2000.  New Zealand’s GDP per adult equivalent was $16,242 in 1970 and $21,675 in 2000. 
2 See Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, and Teece (1996) for a survey of the reforms and their initial outcomes.     2 
    Total factor productivity — as a residual after taking the impact of changes in 
capital and labor inputs out of changes in real output — includes the effects of a 
country’s institutions, such as taxes, openness to foreign competition, and legal system.  
Changes in institutions can change the growth path of TFP.  The identification of these 
changes seems to be the key to understanding aggregate growth in New Zealand.  A 
frequently cited candidate for the cause of New Zealand’s poor performance is the 
decline of its terms of trade.  (See, for example, Rose 1985 and Easton 1997, chap. 5.)  
The beginning of the great depression in New Zealand coincides with its loss of favored 
access to markets in its major trade partner due to the United Kingdom’s accession to the 
European Economic Community (EEC).  Data show a subsequent sharp fall in the terms 
of trade and large changes in New Zealand’s trade patterns.  The resulting disruption in 
production patterns is a promising candidate for the drop in TFP growth rates.   
  In Switzerland, TFP fell steadily compared to trend from 1973 to 1996, and this 
fall explains most of Switzerland’s great depression.  TFP and GDP grew at their 
respective trend rates following 1996, but do not appear to be returning to their previous 
trend paths.  As in New Zealand, that TFP explains almost everything leaves us needing 
to explain TFP.  In particular, we are left looking for the changing institutional factors 
that are reflected in our measurement of TFP.  Switzerland’s institutions include highly 
protected domestically oriented sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, 
construction, and information technology.  These sheltered sectors have had declining 
labor productivity, while the sectors exposed to competition have seen improvements.  
These facts are especially relevant considering Switzerland’s failure to join the European 
Union, a move that would have forced many of these protected sectors to face 
international competition and European Union-mandated deregulation.  Switzerland did 
begin a series of reforms aimed at increasing the competitiveness in these sectors as part 
of its revitalization plan, however.  These reforms began to be implemented in the late 
1990s and seem to coincide with the increased GDP and TFP growth rates found in the 
same period. 
The next two sections outline the neoclassical depression methodology and its 
implementation.  First we present the results of our growth accounting, and then we show 
how a calibrated growth model can reproduce the observed changes in output.  We go on 3 
to discuss possible reasons for the decline in TFP for each country and suggests possible 
directions for future research on determining the causes of the modern great depressions 
in New Zealand and Switzerland. 
 
Neoclassical Depression Methodology 
Studying depressions using the neoclassical growth model is a relatively new 
methodology.  Cole and Ohanian (1999) first applied the growth model to study the Great 
Depression of the 1930s in the United States.  This successful application led to the study 
of depressions around the world using this method, including the depressions in 
Argentina (Kydland and Zarazaga 2002), Canada (Amaral and MacGee 2002), Chile and 
Mexico (Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe, and Soto 2002), France (Beaudry and Portier 2002), 
Germany (Fisher and Hornstein 2002), Italy (Perri and Quadrini 2002), Japan (Hayashi 
and Prescott 2002), and the United Kingdom (Cole and Ohanian 2002).  For more details 
on the methodology, as well as an extensive collection of applications, see Kehoe and 
Prescott (2003). 
We study a country’s economic growth by measuring its real GDP per working-
age person relative to a trend.  We concentrate on GDP per working-age person instead of 
the more common per capita measure since it is consistent with our theoretical economy 
in which the entire working-age population is capable of working.  Because of the 
availability of data, we choose to count those aged 15-64 as the working-age population 
and, thus, most likely to be available for work.  (We compare GDP per working-age 
person and GDP per capita in Appendix B.)  We work with a Cobb-Douglas specification 
of the aggregate technology: 
 
1 , tt t t YA K L
α α − =  (1) 
where  t Y  is GDP in year t,  t K  is the capital stock,  t L  is hours worked, and  t A  is TFP.  
When TFP grows at a constant rate (that is, when TFP is 
( ) 1 t
t AA g
α − = ), the neoclassical 
growth model implies a unique balanced growth path in which output and capital per 
worker grow at the same constant rate,  1 g − .  It is relative to this trend growth rate that 
we measure a country’s performance.   4 
Kehoe and Prescott (2002) argue that this trend growth in TFP represents the 
world stock of useable production knowledge growing smoothly over time and that this 
knowledge is not country-specific. We define the trend growth rate to be 2 percent per 
year, corresponding to the growth rate of GDP per working-age person for the United 
States over the period 1920-2000.  Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider the United States 
to be the best choice because it is a large, relatively stable country and because it is the 
current industrial leader.  As shown in Figure 1, the 2 percent trend in GDP per working-
age person fits the U.S. data very well, with the only major deviations from trend being 
the Great Depression, 1929-1939, and the World War II buildup, 1939-1946. 
The stock of world production knowledge is common across countries, but 
countries differ in their institutional structures.  This implies that, even though all 
countries on a balanced growth path grow at the same rate, each country is on its own 
growth path.  These paths differ in their levels of output per working-age person.  
Countries with institutions that encourage efficiency grow on a path with higher output 
per working-age person than countries with institutions that encourage rent seeking or 
other activities that lower efficiency.  The institutions that determine these paths include 
competition policy, bankruptcy systems, and the legal system.  The parts of these 
institutions that affect neither labor input nor the accumulation of capital are captured in 
TFP.  Changing institutions changes the path of TFP, moving a country to a new 
balanced growth path.  One of the central premises of the neoclassical depression 
methodology is that explaining movements in TFP involves identifying the changing 
institutions. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 display output per working-age person for New Zealand 
and Switzerland for 1920-2000.  Though our analysis is restricted to the recent great 
depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland, the long-term movements in a country 
provide interesting perspective.  As is shown in Figure 2, New Zealand grew on its 2 
percent balanced growth path from about 1938 to 1974, before falling sharply below 
trend.  The period 1929-1932 is what New Zealand economic historians refer to as “The 
Depression” (Hawke 1985).  This episode was marked by a sharp drop below trend, 
followed by a quick recovery.  In contrast, the recent great depression has been slower to 
develop, but GDP per working-age person has deviated more from trend, and for a much 5 
longer period.  In Switzerland, we see a different pattern.  Switzerland experienced 
almost no growth from 1930 to 1944, which is significantly better than the situation in 
other Western European countries, where output fell significantly during the interwar 
depression and World War II.  As did the rest of Western Europe after World War II, 
Switzerland grew faster than trend from 1944 to 1973.  The other countries, however, 
tended to move to new, higher, balanced growth paths in the 1970s and 1980s.  As an 
example, in Figure 4 we plot GDP per working-age person for Italy, whose experience is 
fairly typical of a number of Western European countries.  Italy’s output fell sharply 
during World War II, grew faster than trend as Italy recovered from the war, and then 
settled into a new growth path in the 1970s.  Instead of moving to a new balanced growth 
path, as in Italy, Switzerland’s GDP per working-age person grew much slower than 
trend following 1973.      
  Figure 5 and Figure 6 present output per working-age person for New Zealand 
and Switzerland over the last half-century.  The data are presented with the 2 percent 
trend removed, and the series are normalized so that GDP per working-age person is 100 
in the first year of the great depression.  For New Zealand, the first year of the great 
depression is 1974, while in Switzerland the Depression starts a year earlier, in 1973.  In 
New Zealand, output per working-age person grew on trend from 1955 to 1974 with a 
small deviation from trend in the late 1960s.  Switzerland, however, was below trend, and 
grew faster from 1955 to 1970.  This is not unusual, as most of Europe grew faster than 
the trend growth rate as it recovered from World War II.   What is striking about Figure 5 
and Figure 6 is the severe and prolonged decline in trend-adjusted output that the 
countries experienced starting in the mid-1970s.  New Zealand’s trend-adjusted output 
per working-age person fell by 21 percent from 1974 to 1984, and Switzerland’s GDP 
declined by 19 percent over the period 1973-1983.   In New Zealand, output continued to 
fall and was only 67 percent of its trend-corrected 1974 level in 2000, and in Switzerland 
output was only 70 percent of its 1973 level in 2000.   
  It is important to note that Figure 5 and Figure 6 reflect an internal comparison of 
output growth.  Both New Zealand and Switzerland had relatively high incomes per 
capita compared to many other countries in any given year.  As measured in the Penn 
World Tables, Switzerland had the highest income per capita in the world in 1970 and 6 
still had one of the 10 highest incomes per capita in 2000.  New Zealand ranked eighth in 
1970 and twenty-second out of the 133 countries for which data were available in 2000.
  
The decline in the cross-sectional ranking is another indicator of these two countries’ 
poor growth.    
 
Great Depression or Slow Growth? 
Some might object to our use of the term “great depression” to describe the 
situations in New Zealand and Switzerland.  Mention of the Great Depressions in the 
United States and the United Kingdom during the interwar years conjures up images of 
bread lines and mass unemployment.  The people of New Zealand and Switzerland have 
not experienced this kind of displacement, nor do outsiders view the countries as being 
depressed.  Though these deviations from trend have not resulted in massive 
displacement or brought international scrutiny and concern, a simple comparison with 
Japan places important perspective on the seriousness of the New Zealand and 
Switzerland great depressions.   
Kehoe and Prescott (2002) consider two characteristics important in defining a 
great depression. First, the deviation of output per working-age person from trend must 
be large, and second, the deviation from trend must occur quickly.   Using the 
methodology outlined in the previous section, they define a period of economic growth 
below trend as a great depression if it meets the following three conditions: 
 
1.  There is no significant recovery during the period in the sense that there is no 
subperiod of a decade or longer in which the growth of output per working age person 
returns to rates of 2 percent or better. 
 
2.  There is at least one year in which output per working-age person is at least 20 
percent below trend. 
 
3.   There is at least one year in the first decade of the great depression in which output 
per working-age person is at least 15 percent below trend. 
 7 
It is clear from Figure 5 and Figure 6 that the economic performances of New Zealand 
over the period 1974-2000 and Switzerland over the period 1973-2000 meet these 
criteria. 
   The sizes of New Zealand and Switzerland, as well as their relative importance in 
the world economy, have kept much of the international attention away from their poor 
growth.  To appreciate the importance of this, we only need to look to Japan.  Detrended 
output per working-age person in Japan has fallen by about 9 percent over the period 
1991-2002 and continues to fall.
3  Figure 7 displays detrended output per working-age 
person for Japan.  When we compare Figure 7 to Figure 5 and to Figure 6, it is obvious 
that the current depression in Japan is milder than were the first decades of the 
depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland.  Japan’s importance in the world economy, 
however, has attracted attention to its situation.  The 16 February 2002 cover of The 
Economist reads “The Sadness of Japan” and features a special report on Japan’s troubled 
economy.  Two weeks later, the 3 March 2002 issue of The Economist reports that “by 
several measures, Japan’s slump is now worse than America’s was in the 1930s.”  
  Japan’s economy may be headed into a great depression.  Economists, policy 
makers, and observers agree that the lack of economic growth in Japan is a serious 
concern.  If New Zealand and Switzerland were as large as Japan, their situations might 
be as widely publicized and fretted over.  People know that Japan is in trouble, and not 
just experiencing slow growth.  Compared to Japan, the periods 1974-2000 in New 
Zealand and 1973-2000 in Switzerland were worse and were, indeed, great depressions.  
  Whether or not these countries are still in great depressions remains to be seen.  
From 1992 to 2002, New Zealand managed to grow at or above the trend growth rate.  If 
growth continues to beat the trend rate, New Zealand may be returning to its previous 
balanced growth path.  We cannot rule out, however, the possibility that New Zealand 
may continue to grow at about 2 percent per year and is settling into a new, lower 
balanced growth path.  For Switzerland, the return to the trend growth rate appears to 
happen in about 1996.  From 1996 to 2000, GDP per working-age person grew at a little 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that, because of the rapid aging of Japan’s population, it makes a difference how we 
define working age.  If we define working age as 20-69 years, for example, the drop in real GDP per 
working-age person between 1991 and 2002 was about 14 percent.  The age structures of the populations of 
New Zealand and Switzerland are more stable than that of Japan.  This point is addressed in Appendix B. 8 
less than 2 percent per year on average.  Again, it could be Switzerland settling into a 
new, lower balanced growth path.  We simply do not have enough data, however, to 
determine whether or not these countries are continuing onto lower balanced growth 
paths. Only time can answer this question, and we focus our attention on the period 1974-
1992 for New Zealand and 1973-1996 for Switzerland, periods in which we know the 
two countries were in great depressions.      
 
Growth Accounting  
To evaluate the contributions of various factors to the changes in output per 
working-age person, we set up an accounting framework based on the neoclassical 
growth model.  For a more detailed discussion of the foundations and motivation for the 
particular functional forms and a thorough analysis, see Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and 
Prescott (2002).  
As explained earlier, we model aggregate production using the Cobb-Douglas 
form.  Since we are concerned with growth in output per working-age person relative to a 
balanced growth path, it is useful to write the production function in terms of output per 




















where  t Y  is output,  t K  is capital,  t L  is labor,  t N  is working-age population, and  t A  is 
TFP.  TFP is calculated as the residual after accounting for capital and labor: 
 
1 . tt t t A YKL
α α − =  (3) 
To compute the  t A  series for New Zealand and Switzerland, we compile data on output, 
labor, and investment from each country’s national accounts.  Labor is measured as total 
hours worked.  We construct  t L  by multiplying the country’s average yearly employment 
by the average number of hours worked per week.  Using investment data, we generate 
the series of capital stocks using  
  ( ) 1 1, tt t KK X δ + =− +  (4) 9 
where  t X  is investment (measured as changes in inventories and gross fixed capital 
formation) and δ  is the depreciation rate.  Given a value for δ , we choose the initial 
capital stock so that the capital-output ratio is the same in 1954 as its average over the 
period 1954-1970.  We set  0.056 δ = , which implies that capital consumption as a 
fraction of output,  tt KY δ , is 0.167 for Switzerland in 1970, the same as the capital 
consumption allowance as a share of GDP that is reported in the Swiss national accounts.  
For New Zealand, this value of δ  implies a capital consumption ratio of 0.146 in 1970, 
while in the data it is 0.090.  A value of δ  less than 0.03 is needed to match the capital 
consumption ratio for New Zealand.  We choose to use 0.056 since the lower value of δ  
seems implausibly small compared to the values for comparable countries.    
   We still need to choose a value for capital’s share of income, α .  Unfortunately, 
neither New Zealand nor Switzerland publishes data detailed enough to compute labor 
and capital shares as in Cooley and Prescott (1995) or in Gollin (2002).  These methods 
require, at a minimum, information on the operating surplus of private unincorporated 
enterprises.  When we compute the crude labor share of income ( ) 1 α −  that does not 
account for the self-employed, we find values that imply α  around 0.44 and 0.34 for 
New Zealand and Switzerland, respectively.
4  Gollin (2002) shows that factor shares 
adjusted for self-employment income and sectoral composition are remarkably constant 
across both time and countries, however, and that the capital shares cluster around 0.30.  
Given the evidence presented in Gollin (2002) and our crude calculation of factor shares, 
we choose to set capital’s share of income,α , to 0.300 for both countries.
5  Results of 
numerical experiments not reported here show that our qualitative conclusions are not 
very sensitive to the values that we have chosen for α  and δ . 
  Using the series for labor, output, and the constructed capital stocks, we compute 
TFP for each of the countries.  In the balanced growth path, hours worked per working-
age person are constant, and output and capital both grow at the same constant rate.  It is 
then easy to see from (2) that in a balanced growth path in which output per working-age 
                                                 
4 The crude method is simply 1 α −= compensation of employees / (GDP-net indirect taxes). 
5 It may be the case that returns to land are more important in New Zealand than they are in countries like 
the United States, and that this accounts for the low measured depreciation and the low measured labor 
share.  This is a topic that merits further study.  10 
person grows at 2 percent per year, the TFP component of output, 
11
t A
α − , must also grow 
at 2 percent per year.  Thus, we detrend the TFP component by 2 percent per year.  
Throughout this section and the next, we concentrate on the TFP component, 
11
t A
α − , but it 
should not be confused with the level of TFP,  t A .   
Figure 8 and Figure 9 plot GDP per working-age person and the TFP component 
for New Zealand and Switzerland.  A striking feature of both figures is the similarity of 
the TFP component and GDP per working-age person.  In fact, the simple correlation 
coefficient for the TFP component and GDP per working-age person over the period 
1970-2000 is 0.93 for New Zealand and 0.99 for Switzerland.  This simple statistic 
suggests that TFP has played an important role in determining the growth in output in 
these countries. 
To quantify the contributions of the TFP component and other factors in the 
growth of these two economies, we use our theoretical framework to guide our growth 
accounting.  As in Hayashi and Prescott (2002), we can take logarithms of the production 
function (1) and rearrange terms to relate output per working-age person, hours worked 
per working-age person, the TFP component, and the capital-output ratio: 
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 (5) 
This expression can be used to decompose the average annual growth rate of output per 
working-age person over a number of years, s, into  
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 (6) 
The above expression decomposes changes in output per working-age person into 
changes in the TFP component (the first term on the right-hand side), changes in the 
capital-output ratio (the second term on the right-hand side), and changes in hours 
worked per working-age person (the last term on the right-hand side).  Along the 
balanced growth path, both hours per worker and the capital-output ratio are constant, so 11 
we would expect these terms in (6) to be very small in our growth accounting if the 
economy is on the balanced growth path.   
We present the results of this decomposition for New Zealand in the first column 
of Table 1.  In the period 1974-1980, output per working-age person declined by 2.01 
percent per year.
 6  The TFP component fell by 3.68 percent per year over this period, but 
was offset by the capital-output ratio, which grew at 1.91 percent.  From 1980 to 1992, 
GDP growth was well below the trend growth rate, averaging only 0.29 percent per year.  
Over this same period, the TFP component grew near its trend growth rate, averaging 
1.91 percent per year.  Large declines in labor input over this period contributed to the 
low GDP growth, however.  From 1992 on, both the TFP component and GDP per 
working-age person grew at rates slightly above their trend growth rates.  In this period, 
labor grew substantially, mostly offsetting the decreases from the earlier period. 
The growth accounting for Switzerland, shown in Table 2, attributes even more of 
the change in GDP per working-age person to the TFP component.  In the period 1973-
1996, output per working-age person grew at only 0.44 percent per year, and changes in 
the TFP component accounted for most of this, increasing by 0.47 percent per year over 
the same period.  In this period there were only small movements in the labor input and 
the capital-output ratio.  As has New Zealand, Switzerland has managed to increase its 
growth recently.  Over the period 1996-2000, GDP per working-age person has grown at 
approximately 1.79 percent per year, which is mostly accounted for by a 2.67 percent 
growth rate in the TFP component.  In this period the capital-output ratio’s contribution 
to output growth was negative, as in New Zealand, and labor input was roughly constant. 
The growth accounting confirms our intuition gained from the plots of the TFP 
component and output.  Output growth in New Zealand and Switzerland seems to be 
largely accounted for by changes in the TFP component.  The contributions of labor and 
capital are not trivial, however, particularly the contributions of labor in New Zealand.  In 
the next section we construct a model to explore the extent to which exogenous 
productivity changes can account for the findings of this section.           
                                                 
6 The growth rates can be expressed as approximately percentage growth rates because the difference in log 
values will approximate percentage changes for small changes in the variables.  The decomposition in (6) 
has the advantage of being additive. 12 
 
Baseline Model 
  We calibrate a simple dynamic general equilibrium model to see how much of the 
change in output we can account for using only productivity changes.  In this model 
agents live in a closed economy and have perfect foresight over the sequence of 
productivity.  The model features a representative agent who maximizes the utility 
function 
  () ( ) ( ) 1970 log 1 log
t
tt t t Ch N L βγ γ
∞
= ⎡ ⎤ +− − ⎣ ⎦ ∑  (7) 
subject to a sequence of budget constraints, 
  ( ) 1 1, tt t t t t CK w L r K δ + +=+ + −  (8) 
and has an initial stock of capital,  1970 K .  The total number of hours available for work is 
t hN , where t N  is the working-age population and h  is the number of hours available for 
market work per week.  We choose h  to be 100.  To be consistent with our growth 
accounting, the production technology in the economy is of the Cobb-Douglas form, 
implying the following feasibility constraint: 
  ( )
1
1 1. tt t t t t CK A K L K
αα δ
−
+ += + −  (9) 
The utility function’s parameters β  and γ must be calibrated before solving the 
model.  From the producer’s problem, we have the standard expressions for wages and 
capital rental rates, 
  ()
11 1, tt t t t t t t wA K L r A K L
α αα α αα
−− − =− =  (10) 






















where  0.300 α =  and  0.056 δ =  as in our growth accounting.  We use data on 
consumption, capital, hours worked, and working-age population from 1954 to 1970 to 
compute values for β  and γ  for each year.  We then take averages over this period and 13 
obtain  0.979 β =  and  0.259 γ =  for New Zealand and  0.989 β =  and  0.364 γ =  for 
Switzerland. It is worth pointing out that the high calibrated value of γ  for Switzerland 
compared to that for New Zealand reflects the fact that the average working-age person in 
Switzerland worked much more over the period 1954-1970 than did the average working-
age person in New Zealand.  As Lambelet and Mihailov (2000) stress, the level of hours 
worked per working-age person is high in Switzerland compared to its levels in many 
other industrialized countries.  
  It should be pointed out that the real investment series used to calculate the capital 
stock in (4) and to calibrate the discount factor β using the consumption-investment 
trade-off in (11) is formed by deflating nominal investment by the GDP deflator rather 
than by the investment deflator.  This decision makes a lot of sense when we are thinking 
in terms of the labor leisure trade-off (11).  It makes less sense when we are thinking in 
terms of capital accumulation (4).  An alternative formulation worth exploring would 
replace the feasibility condition (9) with 
  ( )
1 1. tt t t t t t Cq X A K L K
αα δ
− += + −  (13) 
  ( ) 1 1 tt t KK X δ + = −+ . (14) 
Here  t q  is the price of the investment good, measured as the ratio of the invest deflator to 
a deflator for the rest of GDP.  In this framework some of technological progress shows 
up in increases in TFP and some in a fall in the relative price of investment. 
Given the values for the parameters, the initial capital stock, and series for  t N  and 
t A , we solve the model for New Zealand and Switzerland over 1970-2009.  For 1970-
2000 the values of  t A  and  t N  are exactly those from the data, and we set the initial 
capital stock to its 1970 value.  For 2001-2009, we assume TFP grows at the same 
average rate at which it grew from 1954 to 1970 and that the population grows at the 
same rate it did between 1999 and 2000. We impose the terminal condition that the 
equilibrium of the model converge to a balanced growth path by 2009. 
  Figure 10 and Figure 11 display the results of numerical experiments of the model 
for New Zealand and Switzerland.  For both New Zealand and Switzerland, the model 
does a good job of accounting for the falling output per working-age person.  For New 14 
Zealand, detrended output per working-age person fell by 36 percent from 1974 to 1992, 
while the model’s output falls 33 percent over the same period.  The model captures the 
changes in the capital-output ratio as well. The model does not generate the large change 
in labor we see in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Beginning in 1987, the number of 
hours worked per week per working-age person decreased steadily from 24 to 20 in 1991.  
Following 1991, hours worked increased sharply and have remained between 22 and 23 
hours per week. These movements in hours worked are most likely the result of the 
extensive labor market and welfare reforms that were implemented throughout the early 
1990s.  Our model does not take these large policy changes into account. 
  The model reproduces the features of the Swiss data well.  The model’s output per 
working-age person falls by 32 percent from 1973 to 1996, compared with 30 percent in 
the data.  The model also does an impressive job of tracking the capital-output ratio.  
Changes in the model’s hours-worked series also match the data fairly well, although the 
levels are too high, and this accounts for most of the deviations between the model’s 
GDP from that in the data.  Over the period 1970-2000, working-age persons in 
Switzerland have worked fewer hours than they had done during the period 1954-1970 to 
which we have calibrated the parameter γ  that is crucial in governing the labor-leisure 
trade-off.        
In the second columns of Table 1 and Table 2 we display the results of our growth 
accounting on the model’s labor, capital, and output series.  A comparison of the first and 
second columns in Table 1 confirms the model’s ability to generate the features of the 
New Zealand data.  The differences between the model results and the data are largely 
accounted for by differences in labor input:  the data have a smaller drop in hours worked 
over the period 1974-1980 than does the model, but the data have another drop, rather 
than a small increase, over 1980-1992.  Growth accounting in the Swiss model is even 
more striking.  A simple growth model augmented with TFP shocks not only captures the 
changes in output, but also does a good job of matching the contributions of labor and 
capital to output growth.  
 15 
Explaining TFP 
  Our growth accounting makes it clear that understanding the economic 
performance of New Zealand and Switzerland requires an understanding of TFP.  In 
attempting to account for cross-country levels of income per capita, Prescott (1998) 
concludes that only TFP, and not the accumulation of capital or the labor input, can 
account for these differences.  Thus, to explain both the cross-country distribution of per 
capita income and the large movements of GDP within a specific country, we need to be 
able to explain TFP.  Prescott (1998) calls for a theory of TFP and suggests that a 
candidate theory might involve a country’s resistance to the adoption of more efficient 
technologies.  This theory is further developed in Parente and Prescott (2002), in which 
monopoly rights to work practices are considered as an institution that slows the adoption 
of new technologies.   
While there is no broadly accepted theory of TFP, a country’s institutions likely 
play a large role in the evolution of its TFP.  Institutions that may be important include a 
country’s openness to foreign competition, the existence of monopoly rights, the 
prevalence of labor unions, government regulation of industry, and price controls, among 
others.  In this section we discuss some of the institutions in New Zealand and 
Switzerland that are worth investigating.  In particular, we are searching for changes in 
the institutional structure in these countries that took place around the beginning of their 
depressions and have persisted throughout the period.  Temporary “shocks” will not be 
able to account for the prolonged depressions, since neither of these countries has 
recovered to its trend TFP and output levels.   
 
New Zealand 
  Given New Zealand’s poor economic performance after 1974, it should come as 
no surprise that other researchers have studied the determinants of economic growth 
there.  Hall (1996) does aggregate growth accounting for New Zealand based on detailed 
sectoral calculations by Philpott (1993, 1994).  Like us, he finds that TFP is the dominant 
source of fluctuations in real GDP.  A number of researchers focus on the role of 
government intervention in determining productivity.  (See Dalziel and Lattimore 2001 
and Silverstone, Lattimore, and Bollard 1996.)  During the period 1978-1984 the 16 
government made large investments, later judged to have been unproductive, as part of 
the “Think Big” strategy.  The period 1984-1992 was characterized by massive economic 
reforms, which have been characterized by some as ill sequenced. 
 
Foreign Trade 
Here we consider the effects of external shocks on the New Zealand economy.  
New Zealand’s trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP averaged 56 percent 
for the period 1972-1980, larger than that in Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada.  
Since New Zealand is a small open economy, changes in the terms of trade or in trade 
policy from outside the country can have significant effects and are frequently cited as a 
determinant of growth in New Zealand.  As Briggs (2003) stresses, New Zealand’s 
foreign trade has grown much more slowly since 1970 than has trade in the rest of the 
industrialized world. 
  We choose to define the terms of trade as the price of a country’s exports relative 
to the price of the country’s imports.  Easterly, Kremer, Pritchet, and Summers (1993) 
present evidence that terms-of-trade shocks can explain a substantial amount of the 
variance in GDP growth rates in time series regressions.  Working in the same 
neoclassical methodology as this study, Perri and Quadrini (2002) attribute a large 
portion of Italy’s depression in the 1930s to a combination of increasing trade barriers 
and rigid wages.  Grimes (1991) finds that the reduction in New Zealand’s terms of trade 
over the period 1950-1985 was responsible for a reduction in the annual GDP growth rate 
of 0.13 percent.    
Our measure of the terms of trade is constructed using the implicit price deflator 
for exports and imports from the national accounts.  Assume that the prevailing ratio of 
the world price for the goods that New Zealand exports to the price of the goods that New 
Zealand imports is  t p  and that the rest of the world levies an ad valorem tariff of  * t τ  on 
New Zealand’s exports.  Arbitrage implies that the price received by New Zealand 
exporters for their goods is  /(1 *) tt p τ + .  Since the implicit price deflator for New 
Zealand imports measures market prices it includes any tariffs paid on imports.  Let  t τ  be 
the ad valorem tariff on imports into New Zealand.  Consequently, our measure of the 












We plot New Zealand’s terms of trade in Figure 12.  New Zealand’s terms of trade level 
falls to 85 percent of its 1974 level in 1975 and stays low until 1985, when it starts to 
return roughly to its pre 1974 average.  It is significant that the sharp drop in New 
Zealand’s terms of trade coincided with both the beginning of New Zealand’s great 
depression and the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC.  It is, of course, true that 
that sharp drop in New Zealand’s terms of trade from 1973 to 1975 coincided with the 
first oil shock, but much of the persistence of the terms of trade movements after 1970 
can be explained by trade policy.  The improvements in the terms of trade in the late 
1980s, for example, coincided with significant trade liberalization (Evans et al. 1996).  
  Following Belich (1996, 2001) we can divide New Zealand’s recent trade history 
into two periods, recolonization and decolonization.  Recolonization describes the period 
1880-1970, in which the trade between New Zealand and the United Kingdom closely 
resembled that of a colony providing primary materials to its mother country.  As a 
colonial farm, New Zealand’s trade relations in this period were characterized by 
preferential trade arrangements between the United Kingdom and the Dominions.  This 
relationship was key to New Zealand’s economy.  New Zealand exported wool, dairy, 
and pastoral products to the United Kingdom and imported manufactures, fuels, and 
capital goods.  The bulk purchase agreements between the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand guaranteed a market for New Zealand exports during and following World War 
II, and restrictions on imports of other products into the United Kingdom further 
protected New Zealand’s trade.   
  Decolonization began in 1970 and continues today, as New Zealand competes in a 
world market without preferential U.K. relations.  The 1960s ushered in a new era of 
New Zealand-United Kingdom trade policy.  Beginning in 1960, New Zealand lowered 
the preference on U.K. imports and continued to do so until the U.K tariff preference was 
phased out in 1977 (Lattimore and Wooding 1996).  These changes were partially in 
response to the more drastic changes in policy being undertaken in the United Kingdom.  
In 1968, the EEC implemented a customs union that eliminated duties between member 
countries, and imposed a common external tariff.  Five years later, New Zealand’s largest 18 
and most accessible trading partner erected major trading barriers when the United 
Kingdom joined the EEC in 1973.  Though New Zealand retained some special access 
under bilateral agreements with the EEC, this change in policy led to a drastic change in 
New Zealand’s trading pattern.  New Zealand’s external trade was further jeopardized by 
the EEC in third markets.  New Zealand’s agricultural products now had to compete with 
the heavily subsidized agricultural exports of Europe. Even in the United Kingdom, 
where New Zealand still enjoyed some privilege, exporters now had to compete with 
subsidized U.K. farmers (Hawke and Lattimore 1999).   
Evidence of the impact of these barriers is visible in Figure 13 and Figure 14.  
Figure 13 shows the share of New Zealand’s total exports and imports sourced from the 
United Kingdom.  The figure shows the dramatic decline in the United Kingdom’s share 
of New Zealand’s imports and exports throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  Even though this 
share falls throughout the 1960s, there is a sharp decrease from 1972 to 1974 as New 
Zealand dealt with the increased trade barriers.  Figure 14 reveals an important detail of 
this trade pattern.  New Zealand sourced more than half of its imported machinery and 
transport goods from the United Kingdom in 1965, compared to approximately 4 percent 
in 2000. 
The changes in New Zealand’s trade patterns are certainly not entirely driven by 
the EEC customs union.  New Zealand’s protection policies were complex and changing 
throughout the pre-reform era.  Besides tariffs, the New Zealand government used import 
licensing, export incentives, and exchange controls to protect local industry and stimulate 
growth.  Growth and development in Asia is also likely to have had a strong effect on 
New Zealand’s trade patterns.  Goods from Asia have replaced the imported capital 
goods previously sourced from Europe almost percent-for-percent.  It is unlikely, 
however, that New Zealand faced trade policies in Asia that were as accommodating as 
those from the pre-EEC United Kingdom. 
The changes in the terms of trade and the changes in New Zealand’s relationships 
with its trade partners — and the resulting disruption in trade patterns — undoubtedly 
had a major impact on the New Zealand economy.  The results of our numerical 
experiments in the previous section indicate that, to assign significant blame to these 
external shocks as a cause of New Zealand’s great depression, we need to be able to 19 
construct a model in which the impact of these shocks show up in measured TFP.  An 
obvious direction to take in modeling the impact of changes in the terms of trade and 
trade policy would be to model imported goods as intermediates in production as done by 
Amaral and MacGee (2002) and Perri and Quadrini (2002).  A sharp drop in the terms of 
trade and/or an increase in trade barriers can lead to a large decrease in consumption and 
investment.  As stressed by Kohli (2000), however, this sort of shock will have a much 
smaller effect on real GDP because imports are deflated by an import price deflator and 
then subtracted from consumption, investment, government spending, and exports to 
form real GDP.  Consequently, the simple approach that has trade shocks affecting 
production by making foreign inputs more expensive cannot account for a large drop in 
TFP because it has little effect on measured GDP unless labor and capital inputs change.  
An alternative approach would be to model the frictions involved in moving labor and 
capital between the sectors that produce exportable goods and nontradable goods into the 
sector that produce importable goods as in Kehoe and Fernandez de Cordoba (2000).   
A challenge to any theory of New Zealand’s great depression based on trade 
shocks is the observation that the return of the terms of trade to higher levels and the 
trade liberalization of the late 1980s and early 1990s has not, at least so far, resulted in a 
return of New Zealand to its pre 1974 balanced growth path.  
 
Switzerland       
  None of Switzerland’s falling TFP can be explained by changes in the terms of 
trade.  As shown in Figure 15, Switzerland’s terms of trade have been steadily increasing 
over the last 30 years.  Switzerland’s trade patterns have stayed relatively constant over 
the last 30 years, indicating that there was probably not any large change in trade 
relations.  Given the lack of evidence that Switzerland’s external trade has changed 
drastically, we turn our attention to two other possible explanations.    
 
Structural Rigidities 
Hviding (1998) divides Switzerland’s economy into two sectors, the open sector 
and the sheltered sector.  The open sector consists of industries that compete in 
international markets and are not protected by Swiss trade policy.  These industries 20 
include most of manufacturing.  The sheltered sector is made up of the heavily protected 
and subsidized agricultural sector and many of the service industries such as 
telecommunications, information technology, and construction. 
The sheltered sector’s domestically oriented industries are relatively rigid, and 
price-fixing, market-share agreements, and explicit cartels are common.  Swiss industries 
also enjoy a domestic market segmented by canton-specific technological standards and 
licensing.  These rigidities may have had less of an impact on aggregate technological 
growth in the past, but may be coming to center stage as these protected industries 
experience massive technological change.   
Hviding (1998) suggests that the combination of structural rigidities and sector-
specific technological change has acted as a drag on Switzerland’s output growth.  In the 
1950s and 1960s, much of the worldwide innovation took place in the manufacturing 
industries.  In Switzerland, these sectors faced international competition and needed to 
adopt the improving technologies and work practices to stay competitive.  From the 
1970s onward, however, the important worldwide innovations were concentrated in 
sectors such as telecommunications, information technology, and biotechnology.  In 
Switzerland these industries are part of the sheltered sector.  The lack of competition in 
these sectors may slow the rate of adoption of more efficient technologies, thereby 
slowing aggregate productivity growth. 
An analysis of the productivity of these two sectors would allow us to carefully 
evaluate this potential explanation for Switzerland’s poor aggregate productivity growth.  
Unfortunately, we have been unable to obtain detailed data by industry, particularly data 
on capital, for Switzerland.  Faced with this constraint, Hviding (1998) assigns 
manufacturing to the open sector and the nonmanufacturing private sector to the sheltered 
sector.  Given this dichotomy, Hviding looks to labor productivity for evidence of slow 
productivity growth.  Over the period 1965-1975, the Swiss manufacturing sector’s labor 
productivity grew at an average annual rate of 2.75 percent.  In this same period, the 
nonmanufacturing sector’s labor productivity grew at 2.5 percent per year on average.  In 
the period 1976-1996, manufacturing productivity continued its growth, averaging 2.5 
percent per year on average.  Nonmanufacturing productivity growth fell to only 0.5 
percent per year during the period 1976-1996, however. 21 
The combination of structural rigidities and sector-specific technological change 
appears to be a plausible explanation for Switzerland’s poor productivity growth.  This 
preliminary evidence suggests that a detailed analysis of the structure of Swiss industry 
might yield important insights into Switzerland’s great depression.   
 
Foreign Labor 
A second possible explanation for Switzerland’s poor productivity growth may be 
the structure of its work force. Since the early 1970s there has been an increasing stock of 
permanent foreign workers in Switzerland.  These workers tend to be low skilled, and, 
between 1977 and 2000, they have more than doubled their share in unemployment.  If 
new technology and high-skilled workers are complements, then access to a large pool of 
low-skilled workers may hinder the new technology’s adoption.  
Sheldon (2000) finds that technological change in Switzerland is skill biased and 
that the increasing number of low-skilled, permanent foreign workers is slowing 
technological change.  Switzerland’s foreign worker policy allows three kinds of 
temporary foreign work permits and a permanent permit that entitles the holder to the 
same rights as national workers.  In particular, permanent permit holders may continue to 
live in Switzerland even when they are not employed.  Since the 1960s, the fraction of 
foreign workers under permanent permits has increased steadily, more than doubling 
from 1970 to 2000.  Sheldon (2001) reports that the share of permanent and annual 
workers in the total workforce has remained relatively constant at about 18 percent, but 
that the share of these workers in unemployment has increased from about 20 percent of 
unemployment in 1977 to more than 45 percent in 1999. 
Sheldon (2000) estimates a trans-log production function for Switzerland, using a 
panel of 21 industries and 5 types of labor input.  The panel data allow Sheldon to 
classify the foreign workers by their permit type.  The estimations imply that 
Switzerland’s technological change is factor saving with regard to most types of foreign 
workers.  Sheldon (2001) couples this finding with the rising number of available low-
skilled workers and suggests that firms may be substituting low-wage workers for new 
technologies.   22 
The lack of productivity growth in the sheltered sector could certainly be related 
to the foreign worker situation.  The protected sector in Switzerland encompasses many 
industries that are considered large employers of low-skilled labor.  These industries 
include agriculture, restaurants, hotels, and other service industries.  The combination of 
a relatively uncompetitive environment and a large supply of low-skilled workers may be 
important in explaining the recent performance of the Swiss economy. 
 
Quality of Data 
Recent work by Abrahamsen, Aeppli, Atukeren, Graff, Müller, and Schips (2003) 
argue that our finding that Switzerland has gone though a great depression is partially the 
result of the poor quality of Swiss data and that, given this problem with the data, it is 
difficult or impossible to compare Swiss economic performance with that of other 
countries, like the United States.  To start with, Abrahamsen et al. (2003) ignore Swiss 
data for the period before 1980 presumably because they feel that these data are so bad 
that they have to be discarded completely.
7  Notice that, in Figure 6, the period 1973-
1980 was the period of the sharpest drop in GDP per working-age person in Switzerland.  
Abrahamsen et al. (2003) then turn to post-1980 data and point out that, in measuring 
GDP, the United States uses the System of National Accounts of 1993 (SNA93), while 
Switzerland uses the System of National Account of 1968 (SNA68).  The SNA93 
includes a sector for investment in “intangibles” that is not found in SNA68 and includes 
the purchases of software.  If either the rate of investment in intangibles increased or the 
price of intangibles relative to other goods decreased, then the SNA68-measured GDP 
would be lower than the SNA93-measured GDP, conceivably by as much as 5 percent 
over the period 1973-2000.  We discuss this point further in Appendix B.  We should 
bear in mind, however, that Hviding (1998) identifies information technology and 
telecommunications as sheltered sectors, implying that the adjustment in growth in 
moving to SNA93 is likely to be far smaller in Switzerland than it was in the United 
States.  In any case, Switzerland will adopt Europe’s equivalent to the SNA93, the 
                                                 
7 At least this was the argument presented by Yngve Abrahamsen at the “Great Depressions: New Zealand 
and Switzerland in the Late Twentieth Century” workshop at Victoria University of Wellington in February 
2003. 23 
European System of Accounts of 1995, at the end of 2003.  The release of this data 
should help us to better evaluate the importance of this factor.   
Given the arguments of Abrahamsen et al. (2003), we need to maintain some 
skepticism in working with Swiss data.  Simply giving up on the data, however, would 
leave us unable to analyze the causes of the Swiss great depression. 
Abrahamsen et al. (2003) also disagree with our concept of national income and 
depressions.  Instead of using GDP per working-age population, they use output per hour 
worked.  When we compute GDP per hour worked in Switzerland over the entire period 
1973-2000, we find that GDP per hour worked in Switzerland falls by only 14 percent 
compared to that in the United States, while GDP per working-age person falls by 32 
percent compared to that in the United States.  This relative equality of labor 
productivity, Abrahamsen et al. (2003) claim, is an indication that Switzerland is not a 
depressed country.  Thus, they are implicitly defining a depression as a period in which 
labor productivity does not grow as fast as labor productivity in the United States.  
Because their definition of depression would rule out periods in which drops in output are 
driven by massive increases in unemployment, it would probably be best for them to use 
another term. 
Abrahamsen et al. (2003) also look for evidence of depressions using a measure 
much more closely related to ours.  They choose to run a regression with cross-country 
fixed effects to study the determinants of New Zealand’s and Switzerland’s growth.  In 
particular, they estimate equations of the form 
  () ( ) ( ) ( ) , ,, , , ii t it it it it gYL gA gKL HL α γβ ε =+ + + + , (16) 
where g  is the growth rate function, Y is output,  A is TFP, K  is capital, H  is human 
capital, and L is labor for country i in year t.  The country dummy,  i β , captures any 
country-specific, time-invariant growth rate differences.  The authors choose the 
following to serve as a proxy for TFP growth:  
  () () () 01 , 12 ,, 1 , 1 log log it it U St it gA a a T a YL YL − −− ⎡ ⎤ =+ + − ⎣ ⎦, (17) 
where T  is a measure of the stock of knowledge relevant for improving TFP and 
() () log log
US i YL YL −  is the development gap to the frontier country.  The stock of 
technical knowledge, T , is measured by the fraction of the labor force that has completed 24 
some form of higher education.  Human capital is measured as the mean number of years 
of schooling, and labor is measured by the number of people aged 15-64.   After 
estimating the model, the authors find that the country dummy variables for New Zealand 
and Switzerland are not statistically different from zero.  They interpret this result as 
evidence that there are no depressions in these countries and that no “‘slow growth 
puzzle’ remains.”   This result squares up well with our theory-based identity that 
movements in output per working-age person can be attributed to changes in labor and 
capital inputs and to changes in TFP.  Notice that, if  ( ) gA perfectly measured TFP as in 
(3), the relationship in (16) would also be an identity, and not only the country fixed 
effects  i β , but also the error terms  , it ε  would disappear. 
  Given that movements in inputs and TFP can explain output growth, Abrahamsen 
et al. (2003) ask, as do we, What explains these movements in inputs and TFP?  Their 
answer is that Swiss consumer preferences, particularly over the labor-leisure trade-off, 
have changed over time in ways that they have not in countries like the United States.  It 
is worth stressing that this point of view is drastically at odds with that taken in this 
paper.  Our point of view is that, while individuals differ in their tastes, people are the 
same on average, and the institutions that these people face lead to different outcomes.  
For example, the French devote about 30 percent less time to market activities than do 
Americans.  Does this mean they derive more utility from leisure than do their 
biologically identical counterparts across the Atlantic Ocean?  Rather than assume away 
the difference in hours worked by appealing to differences in preferences, Prescott (2002) 
shows that almost all of this difference can be attributed to differences in the two 
countries’ tax systems, and not to different preferences.    
In this paper, we have estimated different parameters β and γ  for New Zealand 
and Switzerland for the period 1954-1970, which we use to analyze the economic 
performances of these countries over the later period 1970-2000.  Our stance is that the 
differences in these parameters across the two countries are due to differences in 
institutions, like labor market policies.  Differences in institutions across the two 
countries are relatively unimportant from the perspective of this paper:  we are not trying 
to answer the question of why Switzerland is more prosperous than New Zealand.  What 25 
is essential for us is to identify any changes in institutions that may have caused the great 
depressions in New Zealand and Switzerland. 
 26 
Appendix A:  Data Sources 
The data used in this paper are available at http://www.econ.umn.edu/~tkehoe/ 




For both New Zealand and Switzerland, data on nominal and real GDP, gross 
fixed capital formation, changes in inventories, exports and imports are from the OECD’s 
National Account Statistics.  The New Zealand data are presented in different systems of 
accounts for the period prior to 1960, the period spanning 1960-1970, and the period 
from 1970 onward.  For Switzerland, the data change account systems only in 1970.  In 
both cases, we join the series by ratio splicing.  Data on Japan’s GDP are from the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/index-e.html).  GDP 
data for the United States for the years 1970-2000 are from the International Monetary 
Fund’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM (IFS). 
 
Employment 
The New Zealand employment data from 1960 to 2000 are taken from the 
OECD’s Labor Market Statistics (LMS) database available through their Corporate Data 
Environment (www1.oecd.org/scripts/cde). The data from 1954 to 1960 are an index of 
employment in all sectors except agriculture from the United Nation’s Statistical 
Yearbook, various years (UNSY). The index is spliced into the LMS data at 1960.  In 
Switzerland, from 1969 to 2000, employment data are from the International Labor 
Organization’s LABORSTA database (LSTA) (laborsta.ilo.org).  Data for 1954-1969 are 
based on an index of manufacturing employment from the UNSY.  This index is spliced 
into the LSTA data at 1969.  Data on employment for the United States for 1970-2000 
are from the LMS. 
 
Hours Worked 
The data on hours worked for New Zealand 1957-1971, Switzerland 1954-1973, 
and the United States 1970-2000 are weekly hours worked in manufacturing from the 27 
UNSY.  Data for New Zealand 1971-1998 and Switzerland 1973-1991 are from LSTA 
and are weekly hours in manufacturing. The data for New Zealand 1999-2000 and 
Switzerland 1991-2000 are from the LMS and are average yearly hours worked.  
 
Population 
For both countries, populations from 1956 to 2000 are from the LMS.  For the 
years 1954 and 1955, the data are from the IFS.  For both countries, data on the 
population aged 15-64 for 1956-2000 are from the LMS.  
 
Terms of Trade 
For New Zealand and Switzerland, import and export price deflators for the years 
1970-2000 are created from data on real and nominal imports and exports from the 
OECD’s National Account Statistics.  The export deflator is divided by the import 
deflator to form the terms of trade.  For New Zealand, the data on the terms of trade from 
1955 to 1970 are unit price indices for imports and exports.  These indices are from the 
IFS.   
 
Trade 
The data on New Zealand-United Kingdom trade are from the OECD’s 
International Trade by Commodity Statistics database. 
 
Historical Data 
Data on GDP for years prior to 1995 are from Maddison (1995).  GDP data for 
New Zealand and Switzerland for the years 1995-2000 are from the OECD.  For Italy and 
the United States, GDP data for 1995-2000 is from the IFS.  Data on population for New 
Zealand and Switzerland before 1956 are from Maddison (1995).  The population data is 
spliced into working age population in 1956 to create the working-age population series 
used in Figure 2 and Figure 3.  The working-age population data for Italy and the United 
States are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators CD-ROM for the years 
1960-2000.  Population data is taken from Maddison (1995) for the years 1920-1960.  28 
This data was spliced into the working-age population data in 1960 to create the working-
age population series used in Figures 1 and 4.   29 
Appendix B:  Robustness of Output Measures 
  In this appendix we consider alternative measures of the population and GDP to 
evaluate the robustness of these depressions, and discuss some issues in the data 
available. 
 
Population Measurement  
  Measuring population as those aged 15-64, rather than the total population, only 
makes a difference in our results if there has been a change in the fraction of 15-64 year 
olds in the total population.   We plot detrended GDP per population measure as well as 
GDP per working–age person in Figure B1 and Figure B2.   The demographics in 
Switzerland have been particularly stable in the last half-century; the fraction of the total 
population aged 15-64 was 0.66 in 1954 and 0.67 in 2000.  Given this observation, it is 
not surprising that Switzerland’s GDP/person differs only slightly when computed using 
different measures of the population.  In contrast, the share of New Zealand’s working-
age population in the total population went from 0.60 in 1970 to 0.65 in 1984 and has 
stayed stable since then.  Consequently, we see some difference in the GDP measures 
when considering different populations in New Zealand.      
 
GDP Measurement and the Terms of Trade  
  Recent work by Kohli (2002) suggests that using real GDP as a measure of output 
in an open economy subject to terms-of-trade fluctuations may understate growth.  Kohli 
argues that changes in the terms of trade can lead to a decrease in measured real GDP if 
the terms of trade are treated as a price phenomenon rather than a real effect.  The terms 
of trade are defined as the price of a country’s exports divided by the price of a country’s 
imports. One method of accounting for changes in the terms of trade is by deflating the 
net exports (exports minus imports) by the implicit import price deflator, rather than 
deflating exports and imports separately.  This method of computing GDP is known as 
command basis GDP.  Rather than use the command basis measure of GDP employed by 
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and other national statistics agencies, Kohli 
(2002) uses a Törnqvist measure of real value added that makes a similar conceptual 
adjustment.  He concludes that over the period 1986-2000, a Laspeyres real GDP index 30 
similar to the one we use understates New Zealand’s growth by 5.9 percentage points 
compared to his measure.   For Switzerland, whose terms of trade have increased rapidly 
throughout this period, Kohli (2000) finds that the conventional GDP measure misses 13 
percentage points of growth compared to his measure.     
  To evaluate the effects of this possible mismeasurement, we compute measures of 
command basis GDP per working-age person.  Our command basis GDP is calculated by 
deflating the consumption and investment portions of the national accounts by their 
implicit price deflators, while we deflate net exports by the implicit price deflator for 
imports.  Figure B3 and Figure B4 display detrended comparisons of conventional GDP 
per working-age person and our computation of command basis GDP per working-age 
person.  In Switzerland, where the terms of trade increased strongly through the 1980s 
and 1990s, the command basis GDP diverges from the traditionally measured series.  
Accounting for the terms of trade in this manner reduces the fall in trend-corrected output 
by 10 percentage points.  Output is still growing slower than trend, however.  For New 
Zealand, the differences in the two series are negligible, as increases in the terms of trade 
in the 1990s offset the decreases in the 1980s.  Notice that, as in Kohli (2002), our 
command basis GDP does grow by 6.0 percentage points more than the conventional 
measure between 1986 and 2000 because of the improvement of the terms of trade over 




The sources of mismeasurement discussed above may lead to small changes in the 
appearance of the GDP per working-age person plots presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6, 
but none of these possible sources of mismeasurement reverses our findings.  No matter 
how we choose to measure it, New Zealand and Switzerland have failed to return to their 
trend-corrected levels of output.  For reasons yet to be fully explained, these two 
countries, which grew on, or above, trend for the 20 years preceding 1974, have fallen 
into a 30-year slump in output growth – modern great depressions.  
                                                 
8 The comparison of our results with those of Kohli (2003) are somewhat difficult because he follows the 
convention employed by Statistics New Zealand of using data for years that end on 31 March while we 
follow the more common convention employed, for example, by the OECD of using data for years that end 
on 31 December. 31 
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Table 1. 
 
Growth accounting in New Zealand: 
Decomposition of average annual changes in  
real GDP per working-age person (%) 
 
 Benchmark  calibration  Alternative  calibration 
  0.350 α = ,  0.050 δ =   0.466 α = ,  0.081 δ =  
  Data Model Data Model 
1974-1980            
Change in Y/N  -2.01 -4.49 -2.01    -4.18  
    Due to TFP Component  -4.19 -4.19 -5.55    -5.55  
    Due to K/Y  2.41 3.21 3.78    3.84  
    Due to L/N  -0.24 -3.51 -0.24    -2.47  
1980-1992      
Change in Y/N  0.29 1.67 0.29    1.48  
    Due to TFP Component  1.83 1.83 2.19    2.19  
    Due to K/Y  0.12 -0.79 -0.23    -1.21  
    Due to L/N  -1.67 0.63 -1.67    0.50  
1992-2000      
Change in Y/N  2.46 2.83 2.46    3.22  
    Due to TFP Component  2.55 2.55 3.29    3.29  
    Due to K/Y  -1.04 -0.49 -1.78    -0.60  
    Due to L/N  0.95 0.78 0.95    0.53  
1974-2000      
Change in Y/N  0.42 0.61 0.42    0.71  
    Due to TFP Component  0.66 0.66 0.74    0.74  
    Due to K/Y  0.29 0.22 0.22    0.14  




Growth accounting in Switzerland: 
Decomposition of average annual changes in  
real GDP per working-age person (%) 
 
 Benchmark  calibration  Alternative  calibration 
  0.350 α = ,  0.050 δ =   0.480 α = ,  0.049 δ =  
  Data Model Data Model 
1973-1996            
Change in Y/N  0.55 0.38 0.55    0.36  
    Due to TFP Component  0.48 0.48 0.23    0.23  
    Due to K/Y  0.33 0.44 0.58    0.53  
    Due to L/N  -0.26 -0.54 -0.26    -0.40  
1996-2000      
Change in Y/N  2.02 2.27 2.02    2.48  
    Due to TFP Component  3.03 3.03 3.70    3.70  
    Due to K/Y  -0.96 -1.23 -1.63    -1.87  
    Due to L/N  -0.05 0.47 -0.05    0.65  
1973-2000      
Change in Y/N  0.77 0.66 0.77    0.67  
    Due to TFP Component  0.86 0.86 0.74    0.74  
    Due to K/Y  0.14 0.19 0.25    0.18  











United States:  GDP per Working-Age Person
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Switzerland: GDP per Working-Age Person 
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New Zealand:  Results of numerical experiments of the model:  




























































































Switzerland:  Results of numerical experiments of the model: 
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